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In the theory of postliberal democracy, a democratic dynamic leads to
a reproducible democratic institutional equilibrium. This in turn leads
to a highly democratic institutional equilibrium. It can be assumed that
democracies must have the capacity to respond to disturbances and
thereby to adapt to the conditions under which they find themselves.
From the theoretical viewpoint of nonequilibrium thermodynamics, it
can be assumed that transformation of democracy over time can be
explained in terms of dissipative process that is related to the self-
organizing system in the evolutionary process of its complexity and
functional adaptability. In this sense, it can be claimed that democracy
is a complex adaptive system functioning in the macroscopic
evolutionary process.
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I. Introduction
Democracy is an ambiguous term in political discussion. Many
people use it in such a way as to make it synonymous with the
phrase "the good society." If we call such a good SOCiety a
democratic system, there must be an institutional mechanism to
sustain it. Democracy is unquestionably good, and
representative democracy is identified with democracy.
Representative democracy is government of the people, by the
people and for the people. Democracy could mean rulers chosen
from among formally equal citizens by some mechanism in
which all these citizens could equally participate. In a sense, it is
a political mechanism for citizen' participation in politics. The
term 'political mechanism' may appear odd, but it enables us to
treat political institutions in terms of their functions and
outputs. All political mechanisms are a means to do something,
for example, to produce certain sorts of decisions or to mobilize
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resources for certain objectives.
To be stable, democracy must be deemed legitimate by the
people; they must view it as the best, the most appropriate form
of government for their society. Indeed, it rests on the consent of
the governed. Such legitimacy requires a profound moral
commitment and emotional allegiance, but these develop only
over time and partly as a result of effective performance.
Democracy will not be valued by the people unless it deals
effectively with social and economic problems and achieves a
modicum of order and justice.
The problem of building a democratic society is one of a
dynamic interaction of rules and actors, with the actors
rendering the rules more democratic, and the increasingly
democratic rules rendering the actors more firmly committed to
and skilled at democratic participation and decision making.
From the viewpoint of postliberal democracy, a democratic
dynamic leads to a reproducible democratic institutional
equilibrium (Bowles and Gintis, 1986, 186). In other words,
such a democratic dynamic, a democratic set of rules, induces a
more democratic culture. This in turn leads to a highly
democratic institutional equilibrium.
In order to analyze the developmental process of democracy I
can apply Easton's idea of political life as an open and adaptive
system. As he says, "the logic behind the idea of an open system
will also make it necessary to seek to develop concepts that
enable us to handle an analysis of exchanges between a system
and its environment" (Easton, 1965a, 62).
Based on his systems propositions it can be assumed that
democracies must have "the capacity to respond to disturbances
and thereby to adapt to the conditions under which they find
themselves." In his words, a system need not just react to a
disturbance by oscillating in the neighborhood of a prior point of
equilibrium or by shifting to new one. It may cope with the
disturbance by seeking to change the environment so that the
exchanges between the environment and itself are no longer
stressful. It can be said that democracy is endowed with
feedback and the capacity to respond to it.
In the dynamic world of processes, democracies manage to
persist. As Easton suggests, "Persistence of a system, its
capacity to continue the production of authoritative outputs, will
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depend upon keeping a conversion process operating." In this
sense it can be assumed that democracy is a goal-setting, self-
transforming, and creatively adaptive system in the macroscopic
process of evolution.
II. Deliberative Process in Democracy
Democracy is self-government, taking charge of oneself. It is a
kind of insurance against going beyond the tolerable level of
mistakes, which is why it is needed even more by those societies
that are not functioning well (Revel, 1993,258). As Revel argues,
only capitalism engenders economic development, only
democracy can correct the worst political abuses and errors.
Liberal democratic capitalism is not the best system but it is the
only one that works. An advantage of democracy is that it allows
people to be successful despite the poor quality of their
governments. The looser the links between government and
society, the more people can be productive despite the mistakes
or the greed of their leaders. This is why political democracy is
the absolute priority compared to all other goals of development,
social justice or anything else.
We can say that democracy is not the disappearance of
problems, it is only the least of them. It is not perfection, it is
merely the best way to meliorate things. Democracy is a
normative concept and cannot be identified in depth without
articulating fully the evaluative conception that justifies its
distinctive institutions. The democratic process takes as given
people's interests and preferences and assumes that they act on
the basis of those preferences. Democracy does not try to modify
the preferences and interests of people in a morally virtuous.
But this process somehow generates dynamics of collective
action that produces morally acceptable results (Nino, 1996,68).
It is true that the actual results of maintaining a democratic
system are more conducive to the intrinsic good than they clarify
the nature of a moral conflict. The maintaining process helps to
distinguish among the moral, the amoral and the immoral, and
between compatible and incompatible values. Citizens come to
discover that a conflict is the result of misunderstanding or lack
of information, or they might come to find ways to settle a
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conflict by bargaintng; negotiation, and compromise. In this way,
deliberation in a democratic society can put bargaining into
place.
Compared to other methods of decision making, deliberation
increases the chances of arriving at justifiable policies. More
than other kinds of political processes, deliberative democracy
contains the means for its own correction. In Deutsch's words,
deliberation goes on in any political organization, even a
dictatorship, but it is at the heart of democratic politics.
Deliberation is the chief process by which policy is determined.
It is a continuous process of debate. Like any genuine debate,
deliberation not only lets each participant promote his own
views and interests, but also gives him the opportunity to adjust
his own view of reality and even to change his values as a result
of the process. All policy decisions involve deliberation (Deutsch,
1974, 194). The deliberation goes on all the time, but at certain
key points it crystallizes into a decision, and then, immediately
after a decision has been made, the deliberation begins again.
Even when deliberation fails at one particular time to produce
a satisfactory resolution of a moral conflict, democracy's self-
correcting capacity remains. This capacity is the only
consistently democratic hope for its application to specific
issues, and a view of how it works in practice as well as how it
might work better. Deliberation contributes to the legitimacy of
decisions made under difficult conditions. Making forums more
deliberative brings previously excluded voices into politics. This
is one cause of a risk of intensified conflict that greater
deliberation may bring. The positive face of this risk, however, is
that deliberation also brings into the open legitimate moral
dissatisfactions that would be suppressed by other ways of
dealing with disagreement. Deliberative democracy seeks
consensus not for its own sake but rather for a morally justified
consensus.
Deliberation takes account of the sources of moral
disagreement in politics. Deliberation responds to this problem
by creating forums in which citizens are encouraged to take a
broader perspective on questions of public policy than they
might otherwise take.
In the practice of our democratic politics, communicating by
sound bite, competing by character assassination, and resolving
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political conflicts through self-seeking bargaining too often
substitute for deliberation over the merits of controversial
issues. As Gutmann and Thompson argue, the conception of
deliberation consists of three principles - reciprocity, publicity,
and accountability - that regulate the process of politics, and
three others - basic liberty, basic opportunity, and fair
opportunity - that govern the content of policies. It would
promote extensive moral argument about the merits of public
policies-in-public forums, with the aim of reaching provisional
moral agreement and maintaining mutual respect among
citizens (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 12).
Reciprocity asks us to appeal to reasons that are shared or
could come to be shared by our fellow citizens. Reaching for
reciprocity is not always successful. But it is a feature of moral
reasoning especially important in politics. It enables us, for
example, mutually to respect one another as moral agents who
share the goal of reaching deliberative agreement even when we
disagree with one another's conclusions. Reciprocity asks that
our empirical claims in political argument be consistent with a
reliable method of inquiry, because these methods are available
to us here and now, but not for all times and all places. By using
the most reliable methods of inquiry, we demonstrate our
mutual commitment to reach deliberative agreement in the
empirical realms that are relevant to moral argument.
Moral conflicts in politics typically take place in, or are
intended for dissemination in, public forums. The third feature
of this disagreement concerns the agents by whom and to whom
the moral reasons are publicly offered. The agents are typically
the citizens as well as the public officials who are accountable to
another for their political actions.
Accountability through moral disagreement in public forums
extends not only to prominent elected officials such as the
president but also to far less conspicious officials, professionals,
corporate executives, union leaders, employers and employees,
and ordinary citizens when they act in a public capacity. The
principle of accountability captures this characteristic of moral
disagreement in politics. These three features of moral
disagreement, then, point to the need for and at the same time
provide the support for the three principles that refer to the
process of deliberative democracy. Taken together these
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principles constitute a process that seeks deliberative agreement
on policies that can be provisionally justified to the citizenry who
are founded by them.
Even when citizens find some provisionally justifiable
principles, their disagreement over public policy may persist.
Actual deliberation has an important advantage over
hypothetical agreement: it encourages citizens to face up to their
actual problems by listening to one another's moral claims,
rather than concluding that their fellow citizens would agree
with them on all matters of justice if they were all living in an
ideal society. Deliberative democracy does not assume that the
results of all actual deliberations are just. In fact, most of the
time democracies fall far short of meeting the conditions that
deliberative democracy prescribes. But we can say that the more
nearly the conditions are satisfied, the more nearly justifiable
are the results likely to be (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 17).
The participants in practical deliberations must regard one
another as 'competent subjects' and 'moral and political equals.'
Their deliberations not only must be free but. also reasoned.
Deliberative outcome, then, would have to respect basic liberty
and opportunity as ongoing conditions of their own legitimacy.
The greater the degree of deliberation that citizens exercise in
democratic decision making, the more confident they can be of
the democratic decisions they make. The principles of
deliberative democracy do not guarantee morally right results,
but they offer a more defensible way of reaching mutually
justifiable policies than do the principles of utilitarianism,
liberationism or egalitarianism alone. In deliberative democracy,
the search for justifiable answers takes place through
arguments constrained by constitutional principles, which are in
turn themselves developed through deliberation. Thus it can be
said that deliberative process can be related to the adaptive
capacity of democracy, which is vital for its maintenance over
time.
III. Adaptive Feedback Process in Democracy
In systems theory, adaptations are responsed to disturbances
that may upset "normal" relations. Adaptive systems are those
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which maintain their essential variables within those limits
necessary for survival within the environments in which they
exist (Marney and Smith, 1964, 113). As Berrien says,
adaptation is defined as a survtval-extendmg process. Without
maintenance input, a system dies, hence adaptation pertains to
maintenance input (Berrien, 1968, 66). Adaptation is a survival-
extending process and occurs when a potentially harmful
maintenance input (an error) from the suprasystem is blocked or
dtsstpated-at the system's boundary or neutralized within the
system (Berrien, 1968, 136).
From a similar systems-theoretical viewpoint, Buckley says
that society, or the sociocultural system, is not principally an
equilibrium system or a homeostatic system, but what he simply
refers to as a complex adaptive system (Buckley, 1968, 490). To
him, the complex adaptive systems (species, psychological and
sociocultural systems) are also open and negentropic. But they
are open "internally" as well as externally in that the
interchanges among their components may result in significant
changes in the nature of the components themselves with
important consequences for the system as a whole.
His perspective of pattern maintenance suggests that
persistence of an adaptive system requires as a necessary
condition the maintenance of the system's "essential variables"
within certain limits. From the analytical perspective for a
political system, Easton argues that it is useful to interpret
political life as a complex set of processes through which certain
kinds of inputs are converted into the type of outputs that we
may call authoritative policies, decisions, and implementing
actions. He assumes that some systems do survive - whatever
the buffeting from their environments - awakens us to the fact
that they must have the capacity to respond to disturbances and
thereby to adapt to the conditions under which they find
themselves. Here he assumes that political systems may be
adaptive. The critical property that a political system shares with
all other social systems is this extraordinarily variable capacity
to respond to the conditions under which it functions (Easton,
1965b, 18). Based on the above theoretical viewpoint, it can be
assumed that the essential variables of democratic system - the
allocation of values for a society and the relative frequency of
compliance with them - are closely related to the stability of
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democratic system over time.
In regard to a democratic system, Upset argues that the
stability of any given democracy depends not only on economic
development but also upon the effectiveness and the legitimacy
of its political system. Effectiveness means actual performance,
the extent to which the system satisfies the basic functions of
government as most of the population and such powerful groups
within it as big business or the armed forces see them.
Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and
maintain the popular belief that the existing political institutions
are the most appropriate ones for the society (Upset, 1959, 64).
The extent to which contemporary democratic political systems
are legitimate depends in large measure upon the ways in which
the key issues that have historically divided the society have
been resolved.
Furthermore, it can be assumed that the effectiveness and
legitimacy of a democratic system have related to the capacity of
the system to allocate values for the society and to assume their
acceptance. According to Easton, there are two major variables
- the behavior related to the capacity to make decisions for
society and the probability of their frequent acceptance by most
members as authoritative. "The capacity of the system can be
conceived as a self-regulating, self-directing set of behaviors"
(Easton, 1965a, 128).
In his words, the capacity of a system to respond to stress will
derive from two central processes found within it, feedback and
response. Information about the state of the system and its
environment can be communicated back to the authorities;
through their actions the system is also to act so as to attempt
to change or maintain any given condition in which the system
may find itself. That is to say, a political system is endowed with
feedback and the capacity to respond to it.
From the systems-theoretical view of flexible capacity, Easton
points out that "feedback enables the members of the system to
learn to know themselves and the situation in which they find
themselves." Mere survival needs alone will give a distinct
advantage to those systems that are sufficiently dynamic and
flexible to modify their own behavior so as to cope with changes
in their structure or in the environment. Beyond survival,
however, feedback enables a system to explore and discover new
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ways for dealing with its problems (Easton, 1965b, 370). As
Easton assumes, "feedback is the dynamic aspect of this kind of
coupling between systems or subsystems." We can expect to fmd
unlimited members and varieties of feedback loops. Through the
interlocking chain of feedback loops, all of the participating
members in anyone loop may be coupled, if only loosely, with
many other members in the system.
Based upon the Eastonian systems theory I can further
developthe-more complex feedback mechanism of a democratic
system. Feedback cycles are basic regulatory or control
processes and are of two types. When a circular chain of
dynamic relationships is oriented toward reaching and/or
maintaining a goal state, it constitutes a negative feedback cycle.
It is basically concerned with achieving, and/or maintaining,
stability and balance around a norm of reference. A positive
feedback cycle is analogously oriented toward productive and
cumulative change in a given state. The change-generative
process may be directed toward purposive growth or decline.
It can be assumed that the dynamic nature of a complex
democratic system may be cognized and conceptualized in terms
of a set of interacting negative and positive feedback cycles.
When these cyclic processes operate in accordance with their
intended or recognized regulatory roles of stability and change,
phenomena maintain their normal character. However, when
these cycles begin to malfunction, Le., fail to perform their
regulatory function, problematic aspects emerge in the
phenomena. The malfunctioning of feedback cycles may be
engendered by their internal constitutive elements, and/or by
exogenous factors (Rastogi, 1992, 18). It is feedback that flows
from the system as a whole and may return through the system
to the point from which it started, spreading its effects in the
system through the chain of feedback loops (Easton, 1965b,
370).
We assume that democracy, like other complex systems, has
both positive and negative feedback loops. A negative feedback
loop is goal-seeking, tending to regulate the system toward some
objective. A positive feedback loop is goal-divergent, tending to
depart exponentially from some point of unstable equilibrium.
But such a positive feedback character, which gives the positive
loop its growth behavior, comes not only from the structure of
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the system but also from numerous variable factors around the
loop. These factors are often set and controlled by other loops in
the system. As these factors change, depending upon the phase
of disturbance, the positive growth loop can be controlled by
negative feedback. The oscillation of a political system is
intimately related to this interaction between positive and
negative feedback processes over time.
We can say that democracy has feedback (negative) devices to
help it cope with stress. A negative feedback mechanism would
play a significant role in a system on the basis of negative
feedback about current and past performance even during
political disturbance. The political elites are capable of
reorganizing their response and if they can recommit their
resources, they can modify their present outputs in coping with
the stress due to the previous output failure. Thus negative
feedback may do more than simply help to regulate the overflow
of political stress.
If I interpret Eastonian systems view correctly, democracy may
not always take advantage of being able to respond to the stress
in such a way as to try to assure the persistence of some kind of
system for making and executing binding decisions. We can
assume that whether or not the potential is actualized in the
system may depend upon the ability of the authorities to deal
with "the conditions creating stress in any phase of the feedback
cycle" [Rhee, 1982, 77). In Easton's words, if they can have a
chance to regulate or eliminate the stressing condition or to
shield the system from them, these conditions of stress may be
unable to push the essential variables - the authoritative
allocation of values - beyond the critical limit. It can be said
that this is typically what happens when democracy survives;
every persisting democracy has adaptive feedback devices to
help cope with stress.
IV. Dissipative Process in Democracy
If democratic systems are capable of persisting in the world of
macroscopic evolutionary process, they must also be able to
change or to adapt themselves to fluctuating circumstances.
Thus it can be assumed that democracy is a goal-setting, self-
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transforming and creatively adaptive system. When we attempt
to understand the macroscopic process of democratic systems, it
is relevant to analyze them in terms of evolutionary perspective
which relies on nonlinear thermodynamic theory.
An evolutionary perspective focuses on mechanisms of
filtering, or trial and error. In the current theory of evolutionary
paradigm, the most important heuristic idea is that evolution is
more than change, more than an array of interacting processes.
Where process is an order of change, evolution is the coming
into being of a new and higher order of process. It is this self-
organization of processes, this ordering of order of change,
which is coming more sharply into focus as evolutionary theory
merges with a dynamic general system theory (Jantsch, 1975,
35).
As not only has the size of society rapidly expanded but
economic structure has fundamentally changed, the democratic
system has become more complex in terms of functions and
structures. It Is suggested that "nonlinear systems like biological
organisms, animal populations, or human societies have evolved
to become more and more complex." Our present society, when
compared to Aristotle's polis or the political system of the
physiocrats, is characterized by a high degree of institutional
complexity and information networking (Mainzer, 1996,275).
From the theory of nonequilibrium thermodynamics, it can be
assumed that there must be a self-organizing system in the
evolutionary development of democracy, which is related to the
interactions between negative and positive feedback in its
system. Self-organization, in the context of cybernetics, implies
the maintenance (based on the principles of feedback) of a
definite level of organization or the self-improvement of systems
(Bushev, 1994, 7).
In the framework of nonequilibrium thermodynamics far from
thermal equilibrium, there is not just a single fixed point of
equilibrium, but a hierarchy of more or less complex attractors,
beginning with fixed points and ending with the fractal
structures of strange attractors. Thus, there is no fixed limit of
complexity. either in biological or in sociocultural evolution, but
there are more or less complex attracto:rs representing meta-
stable equilibria of certain phase transitions which may be
overcome if certain threshold parameters are actualized. The
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structural stability ora society is related to these more or less
complex attractors.
Now it can be said that the dynamics of a democracy is
understood in terms of phase transitions of a dissipative
system's exchange of material, energy, and information with its
environment in terms of complex systems theory. The
institutions of democracy are dissipative structures which may
emerge and stay the same in a particular interval of threshold
conditions in the macroscopic evolutionary process of
democracy.
From the viewpoint of dissipative structure, Mainzer makes a
very interesting suggestion about the evolutionary process of
society. According to him, in the history of industrialized
societies we can distinguish more or less strong economic
fluctuations which may initiate the crash of social institutions
and the emergence of new ones. For instance, the economic
depression in the USA in 1922 was relatively mild and short
lived and did not produce a structural stability of the society. In
contrast to that phase of American history, the stock market
crash of 1929 had a genuine butterfly effect in initiating the
Great Depression of 1933. This crisis caused the financial ruin
of many firms and huge numbers of unemployed, and could not
be managed by the established social institutions (Mainzer,
1996,275).
The capability to manage the complexity of modern
democracies depends decisively on an effective communication
network. Like the neural nets of biological brains, this network
determines the learning capability that can help mankind to
survive. Based upon the framework of complex systems, we can
determine the dynamics of information technologies as they
spread in their economic and cultural environment in
democracies.
In democratic societies, market forces are based on positive
feedback processes and hierarchical forces upon negative
feedback processes. Culture is one such negative feedback
condition or environment - a source of negentropy and stability
in social life. Without such cultural forces of dampening and
inversion, positive feedback appears in interaction systems. The
important implication is that the democratic system as
macrostructure evolves from a mix of market processes and
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hierarchical processes over time.
'Coherent' social systems, by this reasoning, can be treated
conceptually as if their coherence were the product of two
subordinate processes of structuration. What this means more
specifically is that market processes operate macroscopically
with some functional role that mirroring processes play
microscopically, and likewise that hierarchical processes operate
macroscopically with the functional significance held
microscopically by idealization.
The mix of these two kinds of processes affects the evolving
macrostructure of social systems the way the mix of mirroring
and idealization functions in relation to the development of
"self." In theory, therefore, social systems may be described as
more or less "structural" in each of these areas, and as having
evolved with greater or lesser emphasis along a "developmental"
line emphasizing market structuration, or a "developmental" line
emphastzmg hierarchical structuration - though all will display
both forms of structuration in some degree (Smith, 1992,213).
Based on the above non-equilibrium theory of thermody-
namics, furthermore, it can be assumed that democracies as
open systems not only have internal sources of entropy
production but also an external source of entropy production
associated with energy or mass transformation to or from their
surroundings. These systems maintain their structure by
dissipation. Nonequilibrium systems exchange energy and
matter with their environment, maintaining themselves for some
period of time in a "state far from thermal equilibrium" and at a
locally reduced entropy state. In the macroscopic evolutionary
process of democracies, small instabilities and fluctuations lead
to irreversible bifurcations and thus to an increasing complexity
of possible behavior.
The most important feature of the thermodynamic composition
of dissipative structure is the negentropic potentiality.
Negentropy, or negative entropy, and its opposite, positive
entropy, are irreversible thermodynamic processes. Positive
entropy refers to the universal tendency of thermodynamic
structures to evolve irreversibly toward a stage of maximum
disorder called thermodynamic equilibrium. But for dissipative
systems to sustain their growth, they must not only increase
their negentroptc potential, they must also eliminate the positive
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entropy that naturally accumulates over time and that degrades
the systems' internal structuring (Haweyand Reed, 1996, 302-
3).
The internal source of a dissipative system's instability resides
in its boundary-testing properties. That is, dissipative systems
are constantly trying to transform themselves - moving away
from their present point of equipoise to some alternative state.
Evolving through successive instabilities, a living system must
develop a procedure to increase its nonlinearity and its distance
from equilibrium. In other words, each transition must enable
the system to increase its entropy production. The evolutionary
feedback of Ilya Pngogtne, Manfred Eigen and others means that
changing the control parameter of the system beyond a certain
threshold leads to an instability through fluctuations, which
increases dissipation and thus influences the threshold again.
From the theoretical and empirical implication of non-
equilibrium thermodynamic evolution process, it can be found
that democracy as an open system seeks even to control
environmental and internal changes in such a way that they do
not become stressful. In Easton's words, what political systems
as a type of a social system possess uniquely is the capacity to
transform themselves, their goals, practices, and the very
structure of their internal organization. To keep the vital
processes, the essential Variables, of a political system alive, a
system may remodel its structures and processes to the point
where they are unrecognizable (Easton, 1965a, 99).
As Prtgogtne and his coworkers suggested, the "principle of
order through fluctuation" seems to govern the evolution of
physical as well as of biological systems. If order through
fluctuation turns out to be a basic kind of mechanism for the
unfolding of evolutionary processes in all domains, a unified
view of evolution becomes a distinct possibility. The unifying
principle will be found in the dynamic conditions of
nonequilibrium systems and the assurance of continuous
metabolizing, entropy-producing activity and energy exchange
with the environment.
It is assumed that the kind of evolutionary view deriving from
the theory of nonequilibrium thermodynamics is very useful for
the analysis of macroscopic evolutionary process of democracy.
Particularly, the "principle of order through fluctuation" is to
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provide a new light for understanding democratic systems
survival. In transitional societies sufficient nonequilibrium
systems (dissipative structures) transform the more complex
democratic system into new dynamic regimes, which may be at a
higher state of complexity when fluctuations due to the system's
disequilibrium are introduced. The new system can restore its
capability for entropy production, which is at first high and
decreases with rising entropy during each dynamic regime. Thus
it can bg;=;tl;tS_llIned that there must be dissipative system in
democracy in macroscopic evolutionary process.
V. Conclusion
More than twenty years ago some theorists of democracy
argued that there were the intrinsic challenges to the viability of
democratic government which grow directly out of the
functioning of democracy itself. Democratic government does not
necessarily function in a self-sustaining or self-correcting
equilibrium fashion. It may instead function so as to give rise to
forces and tendencies which, if unchecked by some outside
agency, will eventually lead to the undermining of democracy.
As Crozier points out, the superiority of democracies has often
been ascribed to their basic openness. Open systems, however,
give better returns only under certain conditions. They are
threatened by entropy if they cannot maintain or develop proper
regulations. According to his observation, European societies not
only fail to escape this general trend, they also do not face it
with the necessary increase of governing capacities. Politicians
and administrators have found it easier and more expedient to
surrender to complexity (Crozier, 1975, 12).
Beyond a certain degree of complexity, however, nobody can
control the outcomes of one system: if one tries, then
government credibility declines, decisions come from nowhere,
citizen alienation develops and irresponsible blackmail
increases, thus feeding back into the cycle. According to
Crozier's analysis, the governability of West European nations is
hampered by another set of related problems which revolve
around the general emphasis on bureaucratic rule, the lack of
civic responsibility and the breakdown of consensus.
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On the other hand, "it was pointed out that there has been an
explosion of human interaction and correlatively a tremendous
increase of social pressure. The social texture of human life has
become complex and is becoming more and more so, and its
management more difficult. Organized systems have become
tremendously more complex, and they tend to prevail, in a much
more composite and complex social system, over the more
simple forms of yesterday. Western societies faced their greatest
challenge, which is related to the capacity to develop appropriate
decision making mechanisms. As Crozier pointed out, this is the
ungovernability of our SOCiety as a cultural failure (Crozier,
1975,30).
However, from the nonequilibrium thermodynamic theory of
macroscopic evolution, it can be assumed that democracy is a
complex system consisting of political institutions and market
mechanism. As both political institutions and market
mechanism have been interlocking, the democratization process
has been developing. Democracy as an organizing system
predictably involves some combination of increase in size and an
increase in internally generated constraints, as well as an
increase in gross throughput.
The mechanism through which complex systems organize
themselves is, to a large extent, through sets of interlocking
feedback loops. For the purpose of characterizing the self-
organizing behavior of democratic systems in the macroscopic
evolutionary process, we may look at the systems from two
different points of view: how flexible they are in changing their
internal structure and how flexible they are in changing their
patterns of interaction with the environment. As Jantsch points
out, understanding human systems in terms of dissipative
structures would provide a theoretical basis not only for social
and cultural organization but for self-organization toward higher
states of systems organizations (Crozier, 1975, 61).
As living systems theorists suggest, because a higher level of
livtng system contains components made of systems at lower
levels, an operation of the higher level, e.g., an adaptation, is
more complex and can go no more quickly that its component
parts. According to the principle of order through fluctuation, if
systems of any kind are in a sufficiently nonequilibrium state,
have many degrees of freedom, and are partially open to the flow
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of energy (information) and/or matter, then the ensuing
instabilities do not lead to random behavior; instead, they tend
to drive the system to a new state of complexity (1975,37).
From the above theoretical viewpoint of nonequilibrium
thermodynamics, it can be assumed that transformation of
democracy over time can be explained in terms of dissipative
process that is related to the self-organizing system in the
evolutionary process of its cornplextty and functional
adaptability; In this sense, it can be claimed that democracy is a
complex adaptive system functioning in the macroscopic
evolutionary process.
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